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The question is whether a tribal membership 
ordinance, which provides that children of a "mixed" 
marriage between a tribal member and a nonmember shall 
be members if the father is a member but not if the ~ -- .~ 
--- 11  
mother is a member, - violates the equal protection ----------
- 2 -
and due process provisions of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). 
1. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: Petr is an Indian 
tribe with recognized powers of self-government. Its 
membership ordinance was adopted by the Tribal Council in 
1939 in response to a marked increase in marriages between 
Pueblo members and nonmembers. Prior to the enactment of 
the ordinance, membership in the Pueblo for children of 
mixed marriages had been determined on an individual basis. 
Resps are a female member of the Pueblo, married to 
a nonmember, and her child barred from membership because of 
' 
the ordinance. Resps sued the Pueblo and its governor on 
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging 
-
that the ordinance deprives children of female line mixed 
marriages of certain political, land use, and residential 
2/ 
rights - enjoyed by tribal members, in violation of_ the 
provision in the Indian Civil Rights Act that "No Indian tribe 
in exercising its powers of self-government shall • • • deny 
to any person within its jt·.risdiction the equal protection of 
the laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without 
due process of law." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). 
II 
These rights include the right to vote in tribal elections, 
to hold tribal office, to inherit possessory interestsin tribal 
land, and to continue living in the Pueblo after the death of 
the parent who is a member. Lack of membership does not affect 
federal benefits accorded Indians generally. 
- 3 -
The DC (D. N. Mex.) (Mechem) found jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343(4), on the ground that the action 
here was one brought under an Act of Congress [25 U.S.C. 
§ 1302] "providing for the protection of civil rights." 
That Act also waived sovereign immunity. The court went 
on to uphold the membership ordinance under§ 1302(8), the 
equal protection provision of the Act. It reasoned that 
Congress did not intend for the equal protection standard 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act to be as stringent as that 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the standard under 
the Act does not invalidate traditional membership criteria. 
The court did not find that this particular discrimination 
against female line mixed marriages embodied a traditional 
.membership rule, but did find it rooted in the traditional 
patrilinear and patrilocal organization of Pueblo society. 
CA 10 reversed, agreeing with the DC that § 1302(8) 
is not coterminous with the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause and that Congress intended for the courts t~eigh 
t~e importance of tribal custom and cultural identity in ap-
plying the statute. However, CA 10 pointed out that Congress 
chose to include some constitutional provisions in the Act 
(free speech, the Fourth through Eighth Amendments, and equal 
protection) while excluding others (the Fifteenth Amendment 
and the establishment clause) out of a concern for tribal 
cultural identity; thus Congress had already performed some of 
the balancing of individual liberties against tribal traditions 
{ . 
- 4 -
when it included the equal protection guarantee in the 
Act. The court found that the Pueblo had not shown how 
the discrimination here fosters the tribe's cultural 
survival, noting that the plaintiff child here was reared 
at the Pueblo, spoke the tribal language, practiced the 
tribal religion -- and hence in a cultural sense was a 
tribal member. The court thought · that the Pueblo could 
have adopted means other than the instant sex discrimination 
to preserve the patrilinear tradition in the tribe and to 
deal with the economic problems posed by the increase in 
membership attributable to mixed marriages. The court 
distinguJ.8'Sed several CA decisions upholding a quantum of 
~ Indian blood as a criter~. for tribal membership or office-
ik 
holding, because ofAimportance of those qualifications in 
maintaining the "integrity" of tribal membership. 
2. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the Act did not 
intend to waive the tribe's sovereign immunity, that the 
equal protection clause of the Act requires only that tribal 
membership rules be administered evenly, and that ~he instant 
discrimination is necessary for the cultural survival of the 
tribe. 
3. DISCUSSION: I think the decision below is 
correct and consistent with the law in other circuits. 
Q.. 
There areAresponse• and amici briefs in support of 
cert from several Indian tribes. 
1/12/77 
ME 
Spiegel CA, DC opinions in 
petn. 
APPENDIX 
THE 1939 ORDINA-NCE 
December 15, 1939 
Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo of 
Santa Clara, New :Mexico, in regular meeting duly 
assembled, that hereafter the following rules shall 
govern the admission to membership to the Santa 
Clara Pueblo: 
1. All children born of marriages between mem-
bers of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be mem-
bers of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 
·~t:WU$141¥CC® ~; » ... ,...i!!ll .. ~~rr: 
2. All children born of marriages between male 
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall be members of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo. 
3. Children born of marriages between female 
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall not be membe.rs of the Santa 
Clara Pueblo. 
4. Persons shall not be natura ized as members 
of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any cir-
cumstances. 
6/6!'1~ 
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September 20, 1977 
No. 76-682 Santa Clara Pueblo, et al v. Martinez, et al 
This memorandum will merely identify the issues, as an 
aid to memory, and will venture no analysis. As I dictate 
this, I have not looked at the cert memo - which is probably a 
far better summary than I will undertake at this time. 
Santa Clara Pueblo (Tribe) is an Indian tribe of some 
1,200 members. It claims a lineage of "at least 700 years as a 
distinct cultural group". It has been at its present location 
on the Rio Grande River for some 300 years. The Tribe is based 
on an official Indian Reservation "with sovereign powers of 
self government", with a written constitution, a council and a 
president. 
In 1939, and as a response to a marked increase in 
marriages between tribal members and nonmembers, the Pueblo 
Tribe Council adopted an ordinance that distinguished between 
marriages by male members o( the tribe and marriages by female 
members. The ordinance grants tribal membership to "all 
children born of marriages between male members . and 
non-members . " But it precludes membership for "children 
born of marriages between female members ... and non-members". 
2. 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act, 
28 u.s.c. § 1308(3). Subsection (8) of§ 1302 provides: 
No Indian tribe in exercising its powers of self 
government shall 
(8) Deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of 
liberty or property without due process of law. 
The named respondent, Julia Martinez, a member of the 
tribe, married a Navaho who is not a member. Their eight 
children have been reared within the reservation, speak the 
Tewa language of the tribe, practice the traditional religion, 
and - according to CAlO - "the Martinez children are, 
culturally, members of the Pueblo". 
But by virtue of the 1939 tribal ordinance, the 
~ 
children are barred from membership. This results ~ their 
being deprived of various substantial rights, including those 
of voting, holding secular office, and "sharing the material 
benefits of Pueblo membership". 
Children of a mixed marriage, where the father is a 
tribal member and the mother is not, are entitled to full 
membership and enjoyment of all tribal rights. This 
discrimination based on the sex of the parent would be invalid 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The substantive question is whether it also is violative of 
subsection (8) of the 1968 Act. 
3. 
Jurisdictional and Immunity Issues 
1. The first question is whether federal courts have 
jurisidction under 28 u.s.c. 1343(4) over suits alleging 
violation of the Act of 1968? Both the DC and CAlO held that 
federal jurisdiction exists where - as here - action is brought 
under an Act of Congress. Both courts below also agreed that 
to the extent that the Act of 196 8 is applicable, tribal 
immunity is thereby waived or limited. These holdings are 
strongly challenged by petitioner, in the briefs of several of 
the amici
1
and the SG's memorandum of April 26 indicates that 
the questions of jurisdiction and immunity are serious ones. 
The Act of 1968 contains no specific grant of jurisdiction or 
any express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. 
Although I am not at rest, I am inclined to agree with 
the courts below. This case invokes an Act of Congress which 
should be sufficient to establish jurisdiction. And if 
sovereign immunity could be pled against the Act of 1968, a 
substantial part of its purpose could thereby be frustrated. 
The briefs indicate that the four circuit courts of 
appeals that have considered the jurisdictional and immunity 
questions agree with CAlO. 
Merits 
Respondent's brief makes a rather convincing showing, 
based on the legislative history and particularly the report 
-· 
4. 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (brief 13), that the Act of 
1968 was intended to guarantee substantially the same rights as 
those of the U.S. Bill of Rights. Respondents agree, however, 
that although the legal standards of § 1302(8) should be the 
same as those of the Fourteenth Amendment, application of these 
standards must be made in the context of "an Indian tribe with 
distinct cultural traditions and social organization" that 
differ from the states to which the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies. This difference concerns identification of the 
purpose served 
is legitimate. 
by the ordinance and a judgment as to whether it 
~ 
Respondent agrees that the purpose of 
~ 
preserving racial and cultural and racial identity is 
legitimate, but they deny that the purposes are rationally 
served by the ordinance. They point out that "male-line 
children of half or less Indian ancestry, raised away from the 
Pueblo, knowing nothing of its language, culture, religion or 
traditions," automatically become tribal members whereas 
persons such as the children of Audrey Martinez who are 
culturally members of the tribe in every respect are denied 
legal membership. 
CAlO appears to have applied the compelling state 
interest standard (Pet. 43a), one that a majority of the Court 
has never applied to a sex discrimination case. Petitioners 
contend that the rational basis test 
standard, and as I read respondents' 
is the app~iate 
brief they are willing 
( 
5. 
to stand or fall on the "middle-tier" test of Craig v. Boren 
(br. 28): whether the classification on the basis of gender 
serves "important governmental objectives and [is] 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives". 
Petrs' brief is particularly strong in supporting the 
legitimacy of the tribal interest. It also argues that the 
1939 ordinance "is simply a written emobiment of preexisting 
unwritten rule of membership that has been in existence from 
time immemorial". Brief 9. It is also argued with a good deal 
. v 
of reason - and I bel1ee authority that I have not checked -
that both Congress and the federal courts should leave 
1r 
determination of tribal membership to trial law.* 
A 
I terminate my dictation at this point -
inconclusively. The SG has not yet filed his brief. Based on 
the April memo, I would expect the SG to urge reversal on one 
or even all of the three principal issues. There is a fourth 
issue latent in the case, namely, whether this suit could be 
maintained against the President of the tribe individually 
without regard to tribal immunity. I rather doubt, however, 
whether we reach this issue. 
I view the case on the merits as quite close. The 
b 
preservation of trial and cultural identity could best be 
A. 
*This argument has a good deal of surface appeal. But if 
membership in the tribe determines whether one enjoys, or does 
not enjoy, the basic rights apparently sought to be protected 
by the Act of 1968, the argument loses much of its force. 
6. 
preserved on a case-by-case basis without regard to the sex of 
the parent. This, however, could well result in manipulation 
and discrimination. Another alternative would be to provide 
that the children of a "non-tribal"marriage would always be 
denied membership without regard to the sex of the tribal 
parent. This would have the objection, however, of diluting 
the strength of an already weakened tribe. These thoughts 
suggest that the 1939 ordinance is not as wholly irrational as 
it seems to be on its face. 
I will await further briefing, discussing with my 
clerk, the oral argument - and in all probability - will go to 
the Conference and await the views of my colleagues who profess 




between a woman who is a member of the tribe and a man who is 
not, but that mandates membership for children of marriages 
between a man who is a member of the tribe and a woman who is 
not, violates the "equal protection" provision of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §1302(8). It also pres·ents 
the preliminary questions whether the DC had jurisdiction to 
entertain a suit for the vindication of individual rights under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act; and whether the suit was barred 
by the sovereign immunity of the tribe. 
I. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW. 
The named plaintiffs are Julia Martinez and her daughter 
Audrey Martinez. Julia is a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo 
tribe ("Pueblo") and is married to a Navajo Indian who is not 
a member of the Pueblo. Julia and her husband have lived on 
the Pueblo reservation since their marriage in 1941, and Audrey 
and their other children speak the Pueblo language, participate 
in the Pueblo religion, and live on the Pueblo reservation. Since 1946, 
Julia has tried repeatedly to enroll her children as members of 
the Pueblo, without success. Denial of membership prevents the 
children from voting for or holding tribal office, and it prevents 
their mother from passing her house on the reservation and lands 
in which she has a possessory interest on to the children. 
The Pueblo tribe, which has occupied lands near Sante Fe, 
New Mexico for s·ome 300 years, organized and adopted a constitution 
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 u.s.c. §476, in 
1935. Art.II, §1 of the 1935 Constitution provides that children 
of parents both of whom are members of the Pueblo shall be members 
of the Pueblo; and that, "All children of mixed marriages between 
members of the Santa Clara pueblo and nonmembers [shall be 
members], provided such children have been recognized and adopted 
by the [tribal] council." App.2. Prior to 1939, children of 
marriages between women who were members of the Pueblo and men who 
were not were admitted to membership in the Pueblo on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In 1939 the tribal council of the Pueblo, which exercises 
both legislative and judicial power and is elected by all members 
of the tribe over age 18, enacted the ordinance that is at issue - ... 
here. It provides: 
1. All children born of marriages between members 
of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be members of the Santa 
Clara Pueblo. 
2. That children born of marriages between male 
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall 
be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo . 
3. Children of marriages between female members of 
the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members 
of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of 
the Santa Clara Pueblo under any circumstances. 
Since this ordinance was enacted, no children of marriages 
between women who are members of the Pueblo and men who are not 
have been made members of the Pueblo. 
The named plaintiffs brought this suit in the DC alleging 
that enforcement of sections 2 and 3 of the ordinance deprived 
them and members of their class of rights under 25 U.S.C. §1302(8), 
which provides: 
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall - . 
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of 
liberty or property without due process of law; . • • 
The suit named as defendants the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe and 
its elected governor in his individual and official capacity. 
Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 u.s.c. §1343(4), which provides: 
The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced 
by any person • • • 
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or 
other relief under any Act of Congress providing for 
the protection of Civil Rights, including the right to 
vote. 
The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but not damages. 
The DC denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, relying on cases from three other circuits to 
establish that jurisdiction was proper under §1343(4) and that 
sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. E.g., Crowe v. Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (CA4 1974); Laramie v. 
Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (CA9 1973); Daly v. United States, 
483 F.2d 700 (CAB 1973). It held that if exhaustion of tribal 
remedies was a prerequisite of suit under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, plaintiffs had satisfied that requirement. 
After trial on the merits, the DC filed an opinion that 
constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
court stated that defendants had "sought to prove that the [1939] 
Ordinance was merely the written embodiment of ancient custom, or 
alternatively, that the Ordi nance regulated membership for 
religious as well as secular purposes." Pet.App. at 2la. The 
court found that the ordinance did not regulate membership for 
religious purposes, noting that Audrey Martinez (the daughter) 
was allowed to participate in the Pueblo religion as fully as 
if she were a member of the Pueblo. The court thought it was 
"less clear" whether the ordinance was "an embodiment of 
pre-existing ancient Pueblo culture." On one hand, no 
fixed rule had been enforced before 1939 with regard to children 
of mixed marriages, and "In that sense, the establishment of 
any rule must be seen as a break with tradition." But: 
On the other hand, the criteria employed in classifying 
children of mixed marriage .as members or non-members -
are rooted in certain traditional values. It appears 
that Santa Clara was traditionally patrilineal and 
patrilocal - in other words, that kinship, name and 
location of residence were expected to follow the male 
rather than the female line. These cultural expectations 
have lost much of their force, but they are not entirely 
vitiated. The absentee voter lists of the Pueblo show that 
in 1971, 148 members of the Pueblo lived elsewhere. Of these, 
59 were men and 89 were women. In 1973, 143 members lived 
elsewhere, of whom 59 were men and 84 were women. 
Turning to the legal issue, the DC said that other courts 
'~ave consistently held that the equal protection guarantee of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act is not identical to the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection. [cites] Instead, the Act and its 
equal protection guarantee must be read against the background of 
tribal sovereignty and interpreted within the context of tribal 
law and custom." At a minimum, §1302(8) "requires that existing 
tribal law be applied with an even hand." And where tribes have 
departed from traditional methods of choosing leaders, the courts 
have imposed one man-one vote requirements under §1302(8). But, 
the court thought,q§l302(8) should not be construed in a manner 
that would invalidate a tribal membership ordinance when the 
classification attacked is one based on criteria that have been 
traditionally employed by the tribe in considering membership 
questions." Plaintiffs and defendants agree that the Indian 
Civil Rights Act should not be - constrited .. so as to destroy the 
tribe's cultural identity, but plaintiffs , argue the ordinance does 
not rationally further preservation of cultural identity because 
it bars childrn like Audrey, who culturally is a Pueblo, from 
membership while admitting other children who culturally are not 
Pueblos. But, "Even assuming plaintiffs are correct, the Equal 
Protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should 
not be constr ued in a manner which would require or authorize 
this Court to determine which traditional values will promote 
cultural survival and therefore should be preserved and which 
of them are inimical to cultural survival and should therefore 
be abrogated." That is a decision only the Pueblo can make. 
On appeal, CA 10 agreed that the DC had jurisdiction and that 
sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. It disagreed, however, 
with the conclusion 
/that the ordinance did not violate §1302(8). CA 10 first reviewed 
the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act. It 
originated as a bill that provided Indian tribes were subject to 
all the requirements of the Bill of Rights and other pertinent 
constitutional provisions. In response to protests that the bill 
would cut too deeply into traditional Indian culture, the Senate 
subcommittee rewrote the bill to delete its version of the 
non-establishment clause and the Fifteenth Amendment. At the 
same time, it retained the guarantee of free exercise of religion 
over tribal protests. Thus, Congress was aware of the need to 
balance individuals' rights against tribal autonomy and tradition, 
and it meant to make some inroads on the latter in favor of the 
former. But, apart from some general statements, nothing in the 
7. 
legislative history tells how Congress expected the balance to 
be struck in particular cases under the equal protection provision 
of the Act. 
Turning to the case law under the Act, the court noted 
that the equal protection provision has been held not to impose 
precisely the same requirements as its Constitutional counterpart. 
In particular, courts have upheld requirements that persons have 
particular amounts of Indian blood to qualify for tribal membership 
and office. Thus, although the ordinance here would fall under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not necessarily fall under 
§1302(8); for, "The interest of the Tribe in maintaining its 
integrity and in retaining its tribal cultures is entitled to 
due consideration. [cite] And where the tribal tradition is deep-
seated and the individual injury is relatively insignificant, 
courts should be and have been reluctant to order the tribal 
authority to give way." Nonetheless, cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment provide at least a starting point for decision. 
The difficulty in this case, CA 10 thought, is that the 
policy reflected in the ordinance here "is of relatively recent 
origin and so • • • does not merit the force that would be 
attributable to a venerable tradition." Moreover, there was evidence 
that the ordinance was designed as an economic measure, to limit 
the number of persons entitled to shares in tribal property and 
income. Granting the tribe's strong interest in preserving its 
cultural identity, the ordinance does not further that goal because 
it bars cultural Pueblos like Audrey from membership while admitting 
persons who are not cultural Pueblos. All things considered, 
CA 10 thought, "the facts do not support a decision that the 
Tribe's interest [in the ordinance] is compelling." 
II. JURISDICTION. 
Petrs' and amici' first argument is that the courts below 
erred in holding that jurisdiction existed under §1343(4). 
That statute grants jurisdiction over "any civil action authorized 
by law [for relief] under any Act of Congress providing for 
the protection of civil rights ••• " The Indian ~ivil Rights -Act authorizes only one kind of lawsuit. 25 U.S.C. §1303 provides: ..... ~,._......-.. ........,.,_, __ ,_, --..........--... .. 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
be available to any person, in a court of the United States, 
to test the legality of his detention by order of an 
Indian tribe. 
Thus, if a person were detained in violation of the provisions 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act that protect against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, 25 U.S.C. §1302(2), or double jeopardy, 
§1302(3), or compulsory self-incrimination, §1302(4), or speedy 
trial, §l302(6),or excessive bail, §1302(7), or jury trial, 
IA~A411"' ll3o3 
§1302(10), he could bring an actionAto vindicate those rights. 
But no other section in the Act authorizes suit, so that the 
other rights declared by §1302 cannot be vindicated by suit under 
§1343(4). 
In addition, a right of action to vindicate those rights 
should not be implied. First, Congress has provided a remedy 
for vindication of some §1302 rights in §1303, and that remedy 
by implication is exclusive. Second, Congress rejected proposals 
9. 
that would have authorized appeals from convictions in tribal 
courts to federal court, and that would have empowered the 
Attorney General to bring criminal and civil actions to vindicate 
denials of constitutional rights by tribes. Obviously, Congress 
meant to limit judicial intrusion into the affairs of Indian 
tribes. Finally, in hearings held after the Act became law, 
Senator !rv~n, the p~me m~~e:_~~ind ~e Act, stated: 
l This bill does not provide for the ;;deral courts to ~ review all the decisions of the Indian courts. In fact , 
provision for Federal review was in there originally, and 
at the request of a number of tribes we eliminated that 
entirely. The only provision in this bill that provides ~ 
for Federal court interference is writ of habeas corpus, 
and that probably exists as law now • • • 
This statement confirms the argument that §1303 was intended 
to be the exclusive remedy for the rights guaranteed in §1302. 
Resps and amicus United States reply that _a_~ight_of ~ ~ 
ac~n~~.!::...,~pl~~..!~IE....:._h~s._?f §2102. First, 1-D ~ 
Congress' evident intent was to protect the rights that it declared 
in §1302. The habeas corpus remedy of §1303 provides relief only 
in a limited number of circumstances, and would be ineffective 
in protecting such rights as freedom of religion, freedom of 
the press, and due process, where physical detention was not 
imposed. Moreover, the Sen!~e ~e¥o~t on the Act discussed 
or want of jurisdiction 
a series of cases in which federal courts had denied/remedies 
for violations of constitutional rights by Indian tribes, including 
one dispute over tribal membership. S.Rep.No.841, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 9-10 (1967), discussing Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 
249 F.2d 915 (CA 10 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960. The 
intent of Congress must have been to supply a remedy in such 
cases. 
The United States refines this argument, contending that 
the g~ of Cort v. Ash, 422 u.s. 66 (1975) for deciding 
whether to imply a right of action are satisfied. First, 
resps are members "of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted," 422 U.S., at 78, for they are full-blooded 
Indians who have lived on the Pueblo reservation all their lives. 
Second, although the legislative history is quite sketchy as 
to Congress' intent in this regard, "the intention to provide 
[a remedy] seems implicit in the statute's language and its 
purpose." Third, a private remedy would be "consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," 422 u.s., 
at 78, for no other remedy is available. Finally, this is not 
a cause of action "traditionally relegated to state law," for 
absent congressional authorization, the States have no jurisdiction 
over Indian tribes. 
Petrs' reliance on Senator Ervin's remarks is misplaced. First, 
those remarks appear aimed only at the provision in the original 
bill that would have authorized an appeal from tribal courts to 
federal courts in criminal cases, which was, as he said, deleted 
from the final version. Second, because the remarks came after 
the bill was enacted, they cannot carry much weight. 
Finally, all four circuits that have considered whether ,...,-.-P"..,. ....,., ...,.... 
private suits to vindicate §1302 rights may be brought under 
§1343(4) jurisdiction have concluded that they can, although at 
least one district court thinks otherwise. See cases cited 
to Brief for United States at 21-22 n.l9. 
Petrs reply to all this by arguing that resps are not 
without a remedy because the Act remains enforceable in tribal 
courts and because the Secretary of the Interior has the power 
to disapprove tribal ordinances that are inconsistent with the 
Act. Petrs do not claim, however, that either of these remedies 
is open to resps at the present time. 
DISCUSSION: I believe I would follow the four courts of 
appeals that have implied a right of action from §1302. I find 
it hard to believe that Congress would have declared all those 
fine sounding rights without meaning to make them enforceable 
at the instance of one who is denied them. The Court has followed 
this course under a number of other civil rights statutes that 
do not explicitly authorize private actions. E.g., Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975)(right of action under 
42 U.S.C. §1981); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) 
(right of action under 42 U.S.C. §1982); Allen v. State Board 
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)(right of action under §5 of 
Voting Rights Act of 1965). I would not place dispositive weight 
on Congress' enactment of the §1303 habeas remedy, because that 
section seems to me simply a counterpart to the various other 
criminal-process rights enumerated in §1302. I do not think 
either side can draw much comfort from the legislative history. 
The strongest argument against implying a cause of action 
is that federal courts traditionally have not had jurisdiction over 
tribal affairs and that Congress' intent . to change that should 
be expressed more clearly than it is here. Because this argument 
is more relevant to the question whether the tribe's sovereign 
immunity has been waived by the Act, I consider it in the next 
section. 
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
Petrs and their amici contend that this Court long has 
held Indian tribes are immune from suit except to the extent that 
Congress has expressly waived immunity. E.g., Puyallup Tribe, 
Inc. v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 45 U.S.L.W. 4837, 4839 (1977); 
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 
506, 512 (1940). No such explicit waiver can be found here, 
as resps' own argument in favor of implying a cause of action 
demonstrates. 
Resp replies first, that the committee report and hearings 
accompanying the Act show Congress clearly was aware that Indian 
tribes cannot be sued without a congressional waiver of sovereign 
immunityo What is more important, resps argue, is that petrs 
do not distinguish between suits for injunctions and suits for 
damages. While it may be true that an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity is required before a suit for damages can be brought, 
suits for injunctive relief traditionally have been allowed against 
the sovereign by letting plaintiffs use the fiction of suing the 
sovereign's agent, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), even though 
sovereign immunity has not been waived. In this case, the governor 
of the Pueblo - the chief executive officer of the tribe - is 
a named defendant, as well as the tribe itself. And the only 
relief sought is equitable. Therefore, this Court should apply 
the doctrine of Ex parte Young here. In fact, it should go a 
step further, and allow the tribe itself to be named as a defendant 
in a suit for injunctive relief, because E~ parte Young is, after 
all, just a convenient fiction anyway. 
The United States takes about the same line as resps, except 
that it does not insist that the tribe can be made a named party. 
a tribe's 
All the cases relied on by petrs for the proposition that/sovereign 
immunity must be waived explicitly involve suits for damages, and 
so are distinguishable. In a footnote, the United States notes 
that the tribal constitution vests the power to determine the 
membership status of children of mixed marriages in the tribal 
council, which was not named as a party. Thus, the Court might 
deem it necessary to add the council as a party defendant pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 21. But, in the United States' opinion this 
is not necessary, because the relief sought was only an injunction 
against enforcement of the ordinance, and not admission to the tribe. 
This relief can be granted against the governor himself, as chief 
enforcement officer of the tribe. 
Petrs answer these arguments by contending that there is 
no logical justification for holding, in effect, that immunity 
is waived to suits for injunctive relief but not for damages. 
Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity of Indian tribes serves 
I 
both to recognize the special status of Indian tribes as conquered 
nations, and to protect the tribes' financial existence. But 
the tribes' financial existence will be threatened if resps' or 
the United States' position is accepted, because the cost of 
defending against suits for injunctive relief will be crippling. 
In addition, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be given 
special deference where, as here, the suit challenges the tribe's 
right to determine its own membership, because that right is the 
very essence of sovereignty. 
DISCUSSION. Resps appear to have retreated from their 
position in the CA, which the CA accepted, that the Indian 
Civil Rights Act works as a waiver of tribal immunity as well as 
a grant of rights to individuals. I think that what is on 
everyone's mind is the possibility that future plaintiffs will 
bring damage suits against Indian tribes under the Act, and no 
one - petrs, resps, or United States - is willing to argue that 
those should be allowed. Because there apparently is no authority 
against resps'and the United States' position, it seems to me that 
Young has some merit. Again, it is hard 
to believe some kind of remedy to be 
available, and a finding of complete immunity would have the _ effect 
of foreclosing all remedies. 
The one thing that puzzles me is why resps argue that the tribe 
itself should be able to be named as a defendant. It may be that 
resps cannot obtain all the relief they seek without that, but 
as the United States points out, the only relief sought 
an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, and not 
admission to membership in the tribe. If, as the United States 
hints, resps should have named the members of the tribal council 
as defendants in order to get all the relief they seek, resps have 
no one but themselves to blame. It was they, after all, who 
convinced the CA that the Act waived immunity altogether; and it 
is they who now have backed away from that position. If, under 
their current theory, they should have named members of the council 
instead of the tribe as an entity, they are the ones who should ask 
leave to amend their complaint. 
I note that the theory now being urged apparently has not 
been raised in the various courts of appeals that have found 
individuals' 
jurisdiction to hear/suits under §1302 and §1343(4). Those courts, 
without much discussion, have concluded that the Act works as 
a waiver of sovereign immunity and have allowed tribes to be made 
named parties. I doubt whether the spector of money damages, or 
the theory of Ex parte Young, was raised in any of those cases. 
My own inclination would be to hold that a suit for injunctive 
relief can be brought to vindicate rights under the Act, without 
~ _...._.., =-----~ ....... ---~ ... ~ 
reaching the question of money damages. To hold otherwise would 
leave resps holding a set of rights without remedies just as 
effectively as to hold that jurisdiction under §1343(4) did not 
convincing 
lie. Neither would I find/petrs' argument that sovereign immunity 
should be accorded special respect where the tribe's membership 
policies are challenged. That argument suggests no way to distinguiSh 
between suits under the Act challenging membership policies, and 
16. 
suits under the Act challenging other kinds of tribal policies. 
The result of accepting the argument, I suspect, would be to 
immunize a whole range of tribal policies from attack. The 
argument simply does not limit itself as petrs seem to think. 
III. MERITS. 
On the merits, there are disputes both as to the appropriate 
"equal protection" standard to apply under §1302(8), and as to 
the result of applying whatever standard is appropriate to this 
set of facts. The latter problem is complicated because the 
parties cannot agree on what the facts are, and the CA apparently 
took a different view of them from the DC. This dispute serves 
to demonstrate the difficulty of gearing results under §1302(8) 
to particular tribes' traditions; although as will be seen, 
the most sensible way of reading §1302(8) may require just such 
inquiry. 
)\.The most narrow view of the equal protection provision of 
the Act is advanced by three amici and by petrs' reply brief. 
The argument is that §1302(8) states that an Indian tribe shall 
not deny "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of its laws II The substitution of "its" for the Fourteenth . . . 
Amendment's "the" is said to imply that §1302(8) requires only 
that tribal laws be applied to everyone in an evenhanded manner, 
and not that the laws themselves be evenhanded. E.g., Brief for 
Nat'l Tribal Chairmen's Ass'n at 19-20. This argument is buttressed 
by reference to a statement in a committee print of the Senate 
subcommittee, commenting on a version of the bill proposed by 
17. 
the Interior Department: 
The Department of Interior's bill would, in effect, 
impose upon the Indian governments the same restrictions 
applicable presently to the Federal and State governments 
with several notable exceptions, viz, the 15th Amendment, 
certain procedural requirements or-the 5th, 6th, and 7th 
amendments, and, in some resaects, the equal protection 
requirement of the 14th amen ment. 
Staff of Subcornrn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comrn. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Constitutional 
Rights of the American Indian, at 25 (Cornrn. Print 1966)(emph. added). 
Thus, the equal protection provision of §1302(8) was not intended 
to be coextensive with that of the 14th Amendment. Finally, amici 
argue, a number of courts have suggested this is the correct 
construction of §1302(8). 
Resps and the United States reply that no such significance 
can be attached to the use of "its laws" instead of "the laws" 
in §1302(8). Amicus' use of legislative history is misleading, 
because the Interior Dept bill to which the committee print 
referred only prohibited denial of equal protection to "members of 
the tribe," which was changed to "persons" in the Act. Thus, 
although the Interior Dept bill was, as the committee print says, 
narrower than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act is not. Moreover, 
nowhere in the legislative history is there a suggestion that use 
of "its" instead of "the" was thought to have any significance. 
And the only case that lends colorable support to amicus' 
position actually went off on other grounds. Crowe v. Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231, 1237 (CA 4 1974), quoted 
in Brief for Nat'l Tribal Chai rmen's Ass'n at 20. Finally, the 
18. 
argument cannot be squared with Congress' apparent intent to 
apply traditional equal protection notions to Indian tribes. 
If Congress meant to require only equal application of tribal 
laws, it surely would not have used the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which imports notions of equality of the laws themselve~. 
My own view is that this construction is attractive only 
because it would enable courts to avoid evaluating claims that 
Indian laws violate equal protection in light of traditional 
Indian culture, which evaluation will be required under any 
that might be 
other standard/adopted. This is no small virtue, but the 
legislative history lends little support for it. The problem 
with the legislative history is that it concentrates on the 
criminal-process guarantees of the Act, and says little about 
the equal protection provision. However, as was pointed out abov~, 
Congress did delete from the Act those provision~,like the 
establishment-of-religion clause, that it felt intruded too 
deeply into tribal affairs; yet it retained the equal protection 
provision. That fact, together with the fact that Congress 
chose to mirror the language of the Equal Protection Clause in 
§1302(8), would incline me against holding that §1302(8) requires 
only equal application of Indian laws that themselves would be 
unreviewable. 
B. The next position, pressed by petrs themselves, is 
the 
that/tribal law should be subjected to no more stringent test 
than a determination of "whether there is any rational relation 
between the 1939 Santa Clara Ordinance and the cultural and 
19. 
traditional values of the tribe." Brief for Petrs at 27. There 
apparently are two branches to this argument. First, Congress 
and all the courts that have considered §1302(8) agree that it 
must be applied in light of Indian traditions and culture. In 
order to insure that proper deference is paid to those considera~ ­
tions, courts should not apply conventional equal protection 
analysis where "fundamental rights" or "suspect classes" are 
involved. Second, the discrimination claimed here is sex 
discrimination, which the Court never has held is subject to 
strict scrutiny. Scoring an easy point, petrs complain that 
CA 10 erred in finding the tribe's interests in the ordinance 
are not "compelling." 
Under this test - or, indeed, any stricter test - CA 10 
erred in reversing the DC. It ignored the testimony of the 
governor of the Pueblo, who stated what the effects would be 
if the ordinance were overturned: 
It would tend to destroy the Pueblo as a whole •••• 
Without it we would have an influx of people that 
we don't know who they are. They would come in from 
all directions; Indians and non-Indians alike. So it 
would be a destruction on the Santa Clara Indian 
culture. 
Brief for Petrs at 28. In a similar vein, a retired professor 
d6 anthropology and expert on Pueblo culture testified: 
Well, because of the importance of men in connection 
with the carrying on of the culture, the training of 
the children in the socio-religious situation, the 
culture eventually would break down and be lost. 
Id. at 28-29. Resps introduced no expert evidence to contradict 
20. 
this testimony, which the DC evidently accepted. The CA should 
not have reversed because it thought the Pueblo culture could 
survive without the ordinance. 
C. Resps and the United States reply that conventional 
equal protection analysis should be applied under §1302(8), 
albeit with "special weight • • • given to Indian values in 
determining whether a particular tribal action meets the 
established equal protection standard that is applicable ••• " 
Brief for United States at 35. In this case, the ordinance 
discriminates on the basis of sex because it bars women, but 
not men, from passing homes and land to their children, and 
it discourages women, but not men, from marrying outside the 
tribe. Under Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190, 197 (1976), 
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives." And in this case, CA 10 correctly held 
that this test is not met. (The United States also suggests 
that, "Since the ordinance deprives the children of Julia 
Martinez of the political rights that come with membership in 
the Pueblo, it may demand closer scrutiny as a discrimination 
that impinges on fundamental rights"; but it does not pursue this 
argument because it is confident of victory under ~raig v. Boren.) 
Resps make an elaborate argument to show that CA 10 
correctly disregarded the DC's finding that "Santa Clara was 
traditionally patrilineal and patrilocal - in other words, 
that kinship, name and location of residence were expected to 
follow the male rather than the female line." See Brief for 
children 
Resps at 45-49. Resps agree that Pueblo/take their father's 
name, but not that ties of kinship or location are based 
primarily on the male line. Petrs' own anthropoligist 
testified that kinship ties are bilateral to the father's and 
mother's family, and the expert upon whom she relied has written 
that, "The [Pueblo] household is partially extended to include 
relatives on either the mother's or the father's side." Id. at 47. 
As for the anthropologist's testimony that the Pueblo is 
"patrilocal," that testimony directly contradicted the sources 
upon which she relied. Id. at 48. Finally, the DC could not 
safely rely on figures indicating that more women than men 
moved from the Pueblo after entering mixed marriages, because 
those figures must reflect the very discrimination of which 
resps complain. 
What all this means is that the DC's finding that the 
ordinance, although "a break in tradition" in the sense that 
no fixed rules had been imposed before, nonetheless was "rooted 
in tradition," was clearly erroneous. CA 10 correctly discerned 
that the Pueblo's interest in maintaining it~ traditions and 
culture was not served by the ordinance. That ordinance bars 
from membership persons who are in the mainstream of the traditirn 
and culture, and admits persons who are not. The fact that 
the Pueblo admitted children of marriages between women who 
are members and men who are not from 193]: to 1939 demonstrates 
that the ordinance is no part of traditional Pueblo culture. 
22. 
The United States takes a similar view of the evidence. 
It concedes that if the testimony of the governor and the 
anthropologist, quoted above, is "correct," then "the ordinance 
would be substantially related to the achievement of an 
important tribal objective and therefore might well be consistent 
with the equal pro~ection clause of the Act , its discriminatory 
impact on respondents notwithstanding." Brief for United States 
at 39. But the CA was right in holding that the ordinance does 
not serve the purposes claimed. The ordinance cannot be 
defended as necessary to preserve the tribe's economic resources, 
for that objective could be served without discriminating. 
And the anthropologist's testimony about the importance of 
the father in passing on Pueblo traditions is belied by the 
fact that the children in this case are fully assimilated into 
Pueblo tradition and culture. But, the United States adds, 
a different conclusion might well be reached on different facts; 
that is, if a tribe could show that its traditions really were 
handed down from father to children. 
In my view, this is where the case becomes hard. I tend to 
agree with resps and the United States that it would be simpler, 
the 
in one sense, to import/traditional equal protection framework 
into the Indian Civil Rights Act and then to adjust for the 
particular interests of tribes in maintaining their culture and 
tradition. That approach would have the advantage of drawing 
on a body of law that already has been (more or less) worked out. 
In addition, whatever adjustments that would have to be made 
under resps' and the United States' approach for tribal 
tradition and culture also would have to be made under petrs' 
proposed "rational relation" test, because courts still would 
have to identify the particular cultural or traditional interesm 
to which tribal laws would have to be rationally related. 
On the other hand, use of the rational relation test 
might not require a court to delve as deeply into such matters. 
In particular, I worry about cases where the tribal law could 
be upheld only if the tribal interest were found to be 
"'t -
"compelling." That kind of determination, it seems to me, 
puts a court in the position of judging the weight of tribal 
interests in a way that a rational relation test would not; and, 
as the evidentiary dispute in the instant case demonstrates, 
courts are not very well equipped to make such judgments. 
As I view the instant case, however, it presents a 
slightly different problem. Here everyone agrees that the 
asserted tribal interests are important, and the argument is 
over whether the means-end fit is good. Although it is true ------...... _. -- .. 
that CA 10 rode a little roughshod over the testimony of the 
governor and the anthropologist on this point, I do not think 
the DC relied on that testimony. Its view simply was that the 
membership provisions were not subject to the equal protection 
provision of §1302(8), and that, I think, is wrong. The 
children in this case are living proof that the means-end fit 
of the ordinance is not good, whatever the governor and the 
anthropologist had to say. For that reason, I tend to doubt 
whether the ordinance should pass muster under Craig v. Boren. 
The question whether the ordinance would pass a rational 
relation test is closer, because more women leave the Pueblo 
after marrying non-members and because there is some evidence 
that Pueblo traditions tend to be handed down th=ough 
fathers, although they were not in this case. 
My tentative conclusion would be to accept the United 
States' position and to apply traditional equal protection 
-----------analysis with adjustment for uniquely tribal interests. As ~
I read the cases in the courts of appeals, that is roughly the 
solution toward which they have been groping. Although I am 
uncomfortable with the notion of the courts riding herd over 
tribal laws, it seems inescapable that that is what Congress 
mandated when it passed the Act. If Congress had meant for 
a lower standard of review to apply, it would have done well 
to choose some formulation different from the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is a little difficult for me to see 
how the Court could reach a result that would apply petrs' 
rational relation standard in all cases, given the language of 
§1302(8). 
D. Petrs' last-gasp argument is that a tribe's determination 
of who shall be members, like the nation's determination of 
who should be citizens, should be immune from judicial reviewo 
They point out that the Court upheld an immigration law in 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 u.s. 787 (1977) that granted preference to 
illegitimate children of women who are citizens or resident 
aliens, but not to illegitimate children o£ fathers in the same 
position, on the theory that Congress retains plenary power 
over immigration. Similarly, petrs contend, a tribe should 
retain plenary power over membership. 
Resps and the United States reply that Indian tribes, 
unlike the United States, do not possess complete sovereignty. 
Here, Congress has decided that Indian sovereignty should be 
limited by the provisions of §1302 (at least to the extent that 
individuals can sue for injunctions). Moreover, petrs' analogy 
is imperfect because these resps are more like persons born 
in the United States, who automatically become citizens, 
than like immigrants. 
Petrs do not seem to pursue this argument very vigorously, 
and I would not be inclined to take it very seriously. 
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MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to decide whether a federal court may 
pass on the validity of an Indian tribe's ordinance denying 
membership to the children of certain female tribal members. 
Petitioner Sa.nta Clara Pueblo is an Indian tribe that has 
been in existence for over 600 years. Respondents, a female 
member of the tribe and her daughter, brought suit in federal 
court against the tribe and its Governor, petitioner Lucario 
Padilla, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
enforcement of a tribal or!Jinance denying membership in the 
tribe to children of female members who marry outside the 
tri6e, while ext::iidfng membership to chilaren of male inem-
])e;' who marry outside the tribe. Respondents claimed that 
this rule discriminates on the basis of both sex and ancestry 
in violation of Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(ICRA) , 25 U. S. C. §§ 1301- 1303 (i~76) , whwh p;ovides in 
relevant part that " [ n] o Indian tribe in exercising powers of 
self-government shall ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of its laws." !d. , § 1302 (8).1 
1 The Indian Civil Rights Act was initially passed by the Senate in 
1967, 113 Cong. Rec. 35473 , as a separate bill containing six titles. S. 
1843, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). It. was re-enacted by the Senate 
in 1968 without change, 114 Cong. Rec. 5838, as an amendment to a 
House-originated bill, H. R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), and was 
------
76-682-0PINION 
2 SANTA CLARA PUEBLO v. MARTINEZ 
Title I of the ICRA does not expressly authorize the bring-
ing of civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief to 
enforce its substantive provisions. The threshold issue in 
this case is thus whether the Act may be interpreted to im-
1 
pliedly authorize such actions, against a tribe or its officers, in 
the federal courts. For the reason.s set forth below, we hold 
that the Act ca.nnot be so read. 
I 
Respondent Julia Martinez is a fullblooded member of the 
Santa Clara Pueblo, and resides on the Santa Clara reserva-
tion in Northern New Mexico. In 1941 she married a Navajo 
Indian with whom she has since had several children, includ-
ing respondent Audrey Martinez. Two years before this mar-
riage, the Pueblo passed the membership ordinance here at 
issue, which bars admission of the Martinez chHdren to the 
tribe because their father is not a Santa Claran.2 Although 
then approved by the House and signed into law by the President as 
TiUe.s II through VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 
Stat. 77. Thi.ts, the first title of the ICRA was enacted as Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The six titles of the ICRA will be referred to 
herein by their title numbers as they appearod in the version of S. 1843 
passed by the Sena.te in 1967. 
2 The ordinance, enacted by the Santa. 'Clara Pueblo Council pursuant to 
its legislative authority under the Constitution of the Pueblo, establishes 
the following membership rules: 
"1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa ClaTa Pueblo. 
"2. That children born of marriages between male members of the 
Santa Clara, Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa 
Clara Pueblo. 
"3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa 
Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo. 
"4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo under any circumstances." 
Respondents challenged only subparts (2) and (3) . By virtue of sub-
paragraph (4), ,Julia Martinez' husband is precluded from joining the 
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the children were raised on the reservation and continue to 
reside there now that they are adults, as a result of their 
exclusion from membership they may not vote in tribal elec-
tions or hold secular office in the tribe; moreover, they have 
no right to remain on the reservation in the event of their 
mother's death, or to inherit their mother's home or her pos-
sessory interests in the communal lands. 
After unsuccessful efforts to persuade the tribe to change 
the membership rule, respondents filed this lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. 3 Peti-
tioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
the court lacked jurisdiction to decide intratribal controver-
sies affecting matters of tribal self-government and sover-
eignty. The District Court rejected petitioners' contention, 
finding that jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1343 ( 4) and 25 U. S. C. ~ 1302 (8). The court apparently 
concluded, first, that the substantive provisions of Title I 
impliedly authorized civil actions for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, and second, that the tribe was not immune from 
such suit.4 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was denied. 
402 F. Supp. 5 (NM 1975). 
Pueblo and thereby Assuring the children's membership pursuant to sub-
paragraph ( 1). 
3 Respondent. Julia M11rtinez w11s certified to represent. a. class consist-
ing of all women who a.re members of the Santa Clara. Pueblo and have 
married men who are not members of the Pueblo, while Audrey Martinez 
was certified as the class representative of all children born to marriages 
between Santa Claran women and men who are not members of the Pueblo. 
4 Section 1343 ( 4) gives the di:;trict courts "jurisdiction of any civil action 
autho1'ized by law to be commenced by any person ... to secure equitable 
or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of 
civil rights" (emphasis added). The District Court evidently believed 
that jurisdiction could not exist under § 1343 (4) unless the ICRA did in 
fact authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in appropriate 
cases. For purposes of this case, we need not, decide whether § 1343 ( 4) 
jurisdiction ca.n be established merely by presenting a substantial questio1t 
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Following a full trial, the District Court found for peti-
tioners on the merits. While acknowledging the relatively 
recent origin of the disputed rule, the District Court never-
theless found it to reflect traditional va1u~s of patna.rchy still 
sign!Jicant m ihba1 lite. The couf£ ·recogmzed the vital im-
por'iance of responaents' interests,5 but also determined that 
membership niles were "no more or less than a mechanism of 
social ... self-definition," and as such were basic to the tribe's 
survival as a cultura-l and economic entity. !d., at 15.0 In 
sustaining the ordinance's validity under the "equal protec-
tion clause" of the ICRA, 25 U.S. C. § 1302 (8), the District 
Court concluded that the balance to be struck between these 
competing interests was better left to the · judgment of the 
Pueblo: 
"[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act should not be construed in a manner which 
would require or authorize this Court to determine which 
traditional values will promote cultural survival and 
should therefore be preserved . . . . Such a determin~t­
tion should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not 
only because they can best decide what values.are impor-
tant, but also beca.use they must live with the decisipn 
every day .... 
". . . To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the 
delicate area ofmembership, for whatev.er 'good' reaso.ns, 
concerning the availability of a. particulflr form of relief. Cf. Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1948) (jm:isdlction under 28 U.S. C. § 1331). See 
also United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-:-68 
(1933) (Cardozo, J.). · 
r. The court found that "Audrey Martinez and many other children 
similarly situated have been brought up on the Pueblo, speak the Tewa 
language, participate in. its life, and are, culturally, for all practical pur-
poses, Santa Claran Indians." 402 F.-Supp., at 18. · 
6 The San.ta Clara Pueblo is a relatively smaJl tribe. Approximately 
1200 members reside on the reservation; 150 members of the Pueblo live 
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is to destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving 
it." !d., at 18-19. 
On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit upheld the District Court's determination that 28 
U. S. C. § 1343 ( 4) provides a jurisdictional basis for actions 
under Title I of the ICRA. 540 F. '2ll 1039, 1042 (CAlO 
1976). It found that "since [the ICRA] was designed to 
provide protection against tribal authority, the intention of 
Congress to allow suits against the tribe was an essential aspect 
[of the ICRA]. Otherwise, it would constitute a mere unen-
forceable declaration of principles." Ibid. The Court of 
Appeals disagreed, however, with the District Court's ruling on 
the merits. While recognizing that standards of analysis de-
veloped under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause were not necessarily controlling in the interpretation of 
this statute, the Court of Appeals apparently concluded that 
because the classification was one based upon sex it was 
presumptively invidious and could be sustained only if justified 
by a compelling tribal interest. See 540 F. 2d, at 1047- 1048. 
Because of the ordinance's recent vintage, and because in the 
court's view the rule did not rationally identify those persons 
who were emotionally and culturally Santa Clara.ns, the court 
held that the tribe 's interest in the ordinance was not sub-
sta.ntial e11ough to justify its discriminatory effect. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 431 U. S. 913 (1977) , and we now 
reverse. 
II 
Indian tribes are 11distinct, independent political communi-
·ties, retaining their original natural rights" in matters of 
local self-government. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 
Pet.) 515, 559 ( 1832); see United States v. M azurie, 419 U. S. 
544, 557 (1975); F. Cohen, Handbook on Federa.I Indian Law 
122-123 (1941). Although no longer "possessed of the full 
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with the power of regulating their internal and social rela~ 
tions." United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382 
(1886). See United States v. Wheeler,- U.S.- (1978). 
They have power to make their own substantive law in inter~ 
nal matters, see Roff v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 ( 1897) (mem~ 
bership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899) (inheritance 
rules); United States v. Quiver, 241 U. S. 602 ( 1916) (domes~ 
tic relations), a.nd to enforce that law in their own forums, 
see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958). 
As sepa.rate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes 
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those con-
stitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on fed-
eral or sta.te authority. Thus, in 1'alton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 
376 ( 1896), this Court held that the Fifth Amendment did 
not "operat[e] upon" "the powers of local self-government 
enjoyed" by the tribes. Id., at 384. In ensuing years the 
lower federal courts have extended the holding of Talton to 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the Four.-
teenth Amendment.7 
7 See, e. g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chip-
pewa Tribe, 370 F. 2d 529, 533 (CAS 1967) (Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal 
Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (CAlO 1959) (freedom of -religion under First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F. 2d 553 
(CA8 1958), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 932 (1959) (Fourteenth Amend-
ment). See also Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F. 2d 915, 919 
(CAlO 1957), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 960 (1958) (applying Talton to Fifth 
Amendment due process claim); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F. 2d 674, 678 
(CAlO 1971). But see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F. 2d 369 (CA9 1965) 
and Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F . 2d 486 (CA9 1969), cert. 
denied, 398 U. S. 903 (1970) , both holding tha.t where a tribal court was 
so pervasively regulated by a federal agency that it was in effect a federal 
in,stmment.ality, a writ of habC'as corpus would lie to a person detained by 
that court in violation of the Constitntion. 
The line of authority growing out of Talton, while exempting Indian 
tribes from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to State or Fed-
eral Governments, of course does not. relieve State and Federal Governments 
of their obligation · to individual Indians under these provisions. 
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As the Court in Talton recognized, however, Congress has 
plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of 
local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess. 163 
U. S., at 384. See, e. g., United States v. Kagama, supra, 118 
U.S., a.t 379-381, 383-384; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 
U. S. 294, 305-307 (1902). Title I of the ICRA, 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 1301-1303, represents an exercise of that authority. In 
25 U. S. C. § 1302, Congress acted to modify the effect of 
Talton and its progeny by imposing certain restrictions upon 
tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those con-
tained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.8 
8 Section 1302 in its ent.irl'ty provides that: 
"No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government. shall-
" ( 1) make or enforce any Jaw prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of t.he press, or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; 
"(2) violat-e the right of the people to be secure in t.heir persons, houses, 
papers, an,d effects aga.inst. unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable ca.use, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the per::;on or thing to be 
seized; 
"(3) subject any person for t.he same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; 
" ( 4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself; 
" ( 5) take a.ny private property for a public use without just compen-
sation; 
"(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy 
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 
to be confronted wit11 the witnesses against him, to ha.ve compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense; 
"(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and 
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one 
offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term 
of six months or a fine of $500, or bot.h; 
"(8) deny to any person within it~> jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process 
'Of Jaw; 
"(9) pass any bill of a.tta.inder or ex post facto law; or 
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In 25 U. S. C. § 1303, the only remedial provision expressly 
supplied by Congress, the "privilege of the writ of habeas cor-
pus" is made "available to any person, in a court of the United 
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an 
Indian tribe." 
Petitioners concede that § 1302 modifies the substantive 
law applicable to the tribe; they urge. however, that Congress 
) 
did not intend to authorize federal courts to review violations 
of i ts provisions except as they might arise on habeas cor us. 
They e, urt er, t at Congress 1d not waive the tribe's 
sovereign irrununity from suit. Respondents, on the other 
hand, contend that § 1302 not only modifies the substantive 
law applicable to the exercise of sovereign tribal powers, but 
also authorizes civil suits for equitable relief against the tribe 
and its officers in federal courts. We consider these conten-
tions first with respect to the tribe. 
III 
Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the 
common-law immunit from suit traditionall enjoyed by 
soverm n Jowers. Turner v. nited tates, 248 U. . , 58 
(1919); Um e States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 512-513 ( 1940); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U. S. 165, 172-173 (1977). 
This aspect of tribal sovereignty. like all others, is subject to 
the superior and plenary control of Congress. But "without 
congressional authorization," the "Indian Nations are exempt 
"(10) deny to any person arcu~ed of an offense punishable by imprison-
mPnt the right, upon t<>quest, t'O a. trial by jury of not less than six 
persons." 
Section 1301 is a definitional Hrction, which provides, inter alia, that the 
"powers of self-governmrnt" shall include ''all governmental powers pos-
sessed by an Indian tribe, legi~lative, executive and judicial, and a.Jl 
offices, bodies, and tribunaiH by and through whirh they are executed ...• " 
25 U,S,C. ~1301 (2) (1970) . 
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from suit." United States v. United Sta.tes Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., supra, at 512. 
It is settled that. a waiver of sovereign immunity "'cannot 
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' " United 
States v. Testan, 424 U . S. 392, 399 (1976). quoting, United 
States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969). Nothing on the face 
of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the juris-
diction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or 
declaratory relief. Moreover. since the respondent in a 
habeas corpus action is the individual custodian of the pris-
oner, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. ~ 2243, the provisions of § 1303 
can hardly be read as a general waiver of the tribe's sovereign 
immunity. In the absence here of any unequivocal expres-
sion of contrary legislative inteut. we conclude that suits l 
against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign 
im?n umty 1 rom smt . 
IV 
As an officer of the Pueblo, petitioner Lucario Padilla is 
not protected by the tn be's immum£y from suit. See Puyal-
lup 2 noe, 1nc. v. W ashmgton Dept. of Game, supra, 433 U. s., 
at 171-172; cf. Ex parte You·ng, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). We 
must therefore determine whether the cause of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief asserted here by respondents, 
though not expressly authorized by the statute, is nonetheless 
implicit in its terms. 
In addressing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that 
providing a federal forum for issues arising under § 1302 con-
stitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-govern-
ment beyond that created by the change in substantive law 
itself. Even in ma.tters involving commercial and domestic 
relations, we have recognized that "subject[ing] a dispute 
arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a 
forum other than the one they have established for them-
·selves," Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 387-388 
(1976), may "undermine the authority of the tribal court[] ... 
.. 
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and hence ... infringe on the right of the Indians to govern 
themselves." Williams v. Lee, supra, 358 U. S., a.t 223." A 
fortiori, resolution in a foreign forum of intratribal disputes 
of a more "public" character, such as the one in this case, 
cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to main-
tain authority. Although Congress clearly has power to 
authorize civil actions against tribal officers, and has done 
so with respect to habeas corpus relief in ~ 1303, a proper 
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary 
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread 
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent. 
Cf. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199'--200 (1975); 
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). 
With these considerations of "Indian sovereignty ... [as] 
a backdrop against which the applicable ... federal sta,tute[] 
must be read," McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Cornrnis-
sion, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973), we turn now to those factors 
of more general relevance in determmm whether a, cause f 
action IS Imp ICI m a s a u ,e no expressly providing one. See 
0 In, Fisher, we held tha.t a state court did not have jurisdiction over an 
adoption proceeding in whicb all parties were members of an Indian tribe 
and residents of the resPrva.tion. Rejecting the mother's argument that 
denying her a.ccess to th0 Htatc courts constituted an impermissible racial 
discriminat.ion , we reason0d t.lmt: 
"The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the 
race of the plaintiff but m.thf'r from the quasi-sovereign st.atus of the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe und0r federal law ... [E]ven if a jurisdictional 
holding occasiomilly results in denying an Indian plaintiff a. forum to which 
a non-Indian has access, such dispara.te treatment of the Indian is justi-
.fied because it is intended to berwfit the class of which he is a member by 
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government." /d., at 
390--391. 
In Williams v. Lee, supra, we held that a non-Indian merchant could 
not invoke the jurisdiction of a state court to collect a. debt, owed by a 
reservation Indian and arising out of the merchan,t's a.ct.ivities on the res· 
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Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).10 We note at the outset that 
a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of Title I 
was to "secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitu-
tional tights afforded to other Americans," and thereby to 
"protect individual Indians ftohl arbitrary and unjust actions 
of tribal governments." S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 5-6 (1967). There is thus no doubt that respondents, 
American Indians living on the Santa Clara reserva,tion, are 
among the class for whose especial benefit this legislation was 
enacted. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 
39 (1916); see Cort v. Ash, supra, at 78. Moreover, we have 
freguent~,r,ecognized the propriety of inferring a federal cause 
of.!tction for the enforcement of civil rights, even when g on-
gress has spoken in purely declarative terms. See, e. g., Jones· 
v. Alfred 11 . Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,414 n. 13 (1968); Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 238-240 
(1969). See als~ivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). These precedents, however, are simply not 
dispositive here. Not only are we unpersuaded that a judi-
1.o "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the rlass for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,'" Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39' 
(1916) (emphasis supplied)-that is, d<>es the statute create a federal right 
in favor of the plaintift"? Second, is there any indication of legislative· 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of 
Railroad PaJ~sengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, fs 
it consistent. with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme t.o 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securi~ 
ties Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975); 
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relega.ted to state [or tribal] law, in an area basi-
cally the concern of the States [or tribes], so that it would be inappro-· 
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Cort v. .. 
Ash, supra, 422 U.S., at. 78. 
See generally Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under the' Indian CiviT 
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<!ially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty is required 
to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA, but to the contrary, the 
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative his-
tory of Title I suggest that Congress' failure to urovide reme-
dies other than habeas corp us was a deliberate one. See 
Natwna assenger orp. v. ational Assn. of R. R. 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Cart v. Ash, supra. 
A 
Two distinct and ~ompeting purposes are manifest in the 
provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective . of 
strengthening the position of individual tribal members 
vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-
established federal "policy of furthering Indian self-govern-
ment." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); see 
Fisher v. District Court, supra, 424 U. S., at 391.11 This com-
mitment to the goal of tribal self-determination is demon-
strated by the provisions of Title I itself. Section 1302, 
rather than providing in wholesale fashion for the extension 
of constitutional requirements to tribal governments, as had 
been initially proposed,' 2 selectively incorporated and in some 
11 One month before passage of the ICRA, President Johnson had urged 
its enactment as part of a legislative and administrative program with the 
overall goal of furthering "self-determination," "self-help," and "self-
development" of Indian tribes. See 114 Cong. Rec. 5518, 5520 (1968) . 
12 Exploratory hearin~~;s which led to the ICRA commenced in 1961, 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Itd9B4, Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, intro-
duced S. 3041-3048, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., on which no hearings were had. 
The bills were reintroduced in the 89th Congress as S. 961-968 and were 
the subject of extensive hearings by the subcommittee. Hearings on 
S. 961-968 and S. J. Res. 40 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings]. 
S. 961 would have !'xtrnded to tribal governments all constitutional pro-
visions applicable to the Federal Government. After criticism of this 
proposal a.t the hearings, Congress instead adopted the approach found 
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instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit 
the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal gov-
ernments.13 See n. 8, supra. Thus, for example, the statute. 
does not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it 
require jury trials in civil cases, or appointment of counsel for 
indigents in criminal cases, cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 ( 1972) .14 
The other titles of the ICRA also manifest a congressional 
purpose to protect tribal sovereignty from undue interfer-
ence. For instance, Title III, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321-1326, 
hailed by some of the ICRA's supporters as the most impor-
tant part of the Act/5 provides that States may not assume 
in a subst.itute bill submitted by the Interior Department., reprinted in 
1965 Hearings, supra, at 318, which, with some changes in wording, was 
enacted into law as 25 U. S. C. §§ 1302-1303. See also n. 1, supra. 
13 See, e. g., Subcommittee on Constitutional Right,;, Senate .Tuclicia.ry 
Committee, Constitutional Rights of the American, Indian: Summary 
Report of Hearings and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res. 194, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess., 8-11, 25 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as Summary 
Report]; 1965 Hearings, supra, at 17, 21, 50 (statements of Solicitor of 
the Dept. of Interior); id., at 65 (statement of Arthur Laza.rus, Counsel 
for the Association of American Indian Affairs). 
H The provision~ of § 1302, set forth fully in n. 8, supra, differ in lan-
guage and in substance in ma.ny other respects from those contained ip. the 
constitutional provisions on which they were modeled. The provisions of 
the Second and Third Amendments, in addition to those of the Seventh 
Amendment, were omitted entirely. The provision here at issue, § 1302 
(8), differs from the constitutional Equal Protection Clause in that it 
guarantees "the equal protection of its [the tribe's] laws," rather than 
of "the laws." Moreover, § 1302 (7), which prohibits cruel or unusual 
punishments and excessive ba.ils, sets an absolute limit of six rnonths 
imprisonment and a $500 fine on penalties which a tribe may impose. 
Finally, while most of the guarantees of t.he Fifth Amendment were 
extended to tribal actions, it is interesting to note that § 1302 does not 
require tribal criminal prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury indict-
ment, which was the requirement. of the Fift.h Amendment specifically at 
issue and found inapplicable to tribes in Talton v. Mayes, cliscussed, supra, 
J>P· 6-7. 
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civil or criminal jurisdiction over "Indian country" without 
the prior consent of the tribe, thereby abrogating prior law to 
the contrary.16 Other titles of the ICRA provide for strength-
ening certain tribal courts through training of Indian judges,u 
and for minimizing interference by the Federal Bureau of 
Indian Affairs in triballitigation.18 
Where Congress seeks to promote dual objectives in a single 
statute, courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer 
from its silence a cause of action that, while serving one 
legislative purpose, will disserve the other. Creation of a 
federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights created 
in Title 1, however useful it might. be in securing compliance 
Hearings on the Rights of Members of the Indian Tribes before the Sub-
committee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior & Insular 
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 (1968) (hereinafter cited as House Hear-
ings). See also 1965 Hearings, supra, at 198 (remarks of Executive Direc-
tor, NationiU. Congress cif American Indians). 
u In 25 U. S. C. § 1323 (b), Congress expressly repealed § 7 of Pub. L. 
83-280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953), which had authorized States to assume crimi-
nal and civil jurisdiction over reservations without tribal consent. 
17 Title II of the ICRA provides, inter alia, "for the establishing of 
educational classes for the training of judges of courts of Indian offenses."' 
25 U. S. C. § 1311 ( 4) (1970). Courts of Indian offenses were created by 
the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs to administer criminal justice for· 
those tribes lacking their own criminal courts. See generally W. Hagan,. 
Indian Police and Judges 104-125 (1966). 
18 Under 25 U. S. C. § 81, the Secreta,ry of the Interior and the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs a.re generally required to approve any con-
tract made between a tribe and an attorney. At the exploratory hearings, 
see n. 12, supra, it. became apparent that the Interior Department had' 
engaged in inordinate delays in a.pproving such contracts and had thereby 
hindered the tribes in defending and a.Bserting their legal rights. See, e. g., . 
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian before the· 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt.. I), 211 (1961) [hereinafter cit~d as 1961. 
Hearings]; id. (Pt. II), 290, 341, 410. Title V of the ICRA, 25 U. S. C .. 
§ 1331, provides that t.he Department must act on applications for approval'. 
of attorney dontmcts within 90 days of their submission or the application~ 
Wil.l b_e de¢~ed. tQ. have been granted, 
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with § 1302, plainly would be at odds with the congressional 
goal of protecting tribal self-government. Not only would it 
undermine the authority of tribal forums, see pp. 9-10, supra, 
but it would also impose serious financial burdens on already 
11financially disadvantaged" tribes. Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee, Constitutional 
Rights of the American Indian: Summary Report of Hearings 
and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res. 194, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess., 12 (Comm. Print 1966) (hereinafter cited as Sum-
ma.ry Report) ?0 
Moreover, contrary to the reasoning of the court below, im-
plication of a federal remedy in addition to habeas corpus 
is not plainly required to give effect to Congress' objective of 
extending constitutional norms to tribal self-govermnent. 
Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the 
ICRA, and § 1302 has the substa.ntial and intended effect of 
changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply.20 
19 The cost. of civil litigation in fE.'deral district courts, in many instances 
located far from the reservations, doubtless exceeds that in most tribal 
forums. See generally I American Indian Policy Review Commission, 
Final Report 160-166 (1977); M. Price, Law and the American Indian 
154-160 (1973). And a became apparent in congressional hearings on 
the ICRA, many of the poorer tribet:i with limit<'d resources and income 
could ill afford to shoulder the burdens of defending federal lawsuits . See, 
e. g., 1965 Hearing:;, sup1'a, at 131, 157; Summary Report, supra, at 12; 
House Hearings, supra, a.t 69 (remarks of the Govern,or of the San Felipe 
Pueblo) . 
20 Prior to passage of the ICRA, Congress made detailed inquirie::; into the 
extent to which tribal constitutions incorporated "Bill of Rights" gua.ran-
tees, and the degree to which the tribal provisions differed from those 
found in the Constitution. See, e. g., 1961 Hearings (Pt. I), supra, at 121, 
166; id. (Pt. II) , 359; Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Amer-
ican Indian before the Subcommittee on Con ·t itutional Rights of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. IV), 823 (1963). 
Both Senator Ervin , the ICRA's chief sponsor, and President Johnson, in 
urging passage of the Act, explained the need for Title I on the ground 
th~t few tribal con:stitutions included provisions of the Bill of Rights. See 
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Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate 
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting 
important personal and property interests of both Indians and 
non-Indians. 21 Seei e. g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 
382 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 V. S. 217 (1959). See also 
Ex parteCrow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Nonjudicial tribal 
institutions have also been recognized as competent law-
applying·bodies. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 
(1975).22 Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to dis-
turb the balance between the dual statutory objectives which 
Congress apparently struck in providing only for habeas cor-
pus relief. 
B 
Our reluctance is strongly reinforced by the specific legis-
lative history underlying 25 U. S. C. § 1303. · 'This history, 
House Hearings, supra, at 131 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 114 Cong. Rec. 
5520 (1968) (Message from the President). 
21 There t~re 287 tribal governments in operation in the United Sta.tes, 
of which 117 had operating t'ribal courts in 1973. I American Indian Pol-
icy Review Commission, Final Report, 5, 1963 (1977) . In 1973 these 
courts handled approximately 70,000 cases. Id., at 163-164. Judgments 
of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their juri::;diction, have been 
regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other 
courts . See, e. g., Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U. S. 100 (1855); Standley v. 
Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (CA8 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 1999 
(1896). 
22 By the terms of its Constitution, adopted in 1935 and approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior in a.ccordan.ce with the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 476, ]11dicial authority in the Santa Clara. Pueblo 
is vested in its tribal council. 
Many tribal constitutions adopted pmsuant to 28 U. S. C. § 476, though 
not that of the Santa Clara Pneblo, include provisions requiring that triba.I 
ordinances not be given effect until the Department. of Interior gives its 
approval. See I American Indi:m Policy Review Commission, supra, at 
187-188; 1961 Hea.rings (Pt. I), supra, at 95. In these in,stances, persons 
:aggrieved by tribal laws may, in addition to pursuing tribal remedies, be 
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extending over more than three years,~3 indicates that Con-
gress' provision for habeas corpus relief, and nothing more, 
reflected a considered accommodation of the competing goals 
of "preventiug injustices perpetrated by tribal governments, 
on the one hand, a.nd, on the other, avoiding undue or precipi-
tous interference in the affairs of the Indian people." Sum-
mary Report, supra, at 11. 
In settling on habeas corpus as the exclusive means for 
federal court review of tribal criminal proceedings, Congress 
opted for a less intrusive review mechauism than had been 
initially proposed. Originally. the legislation would have 
authorized de novo review in federal court of all convictions 
obtained in tribal courts.24 At hearings held on the proposed 
legislation in 1965, however, it became clear that even those 
in agreement with the general thrust of the review provision-
to provide some form of judicial review of criminal proceed-
ings in tribal courts-believed that de novo review would 
impose unmanageable financial burdens on tribal governments 
and needlessly displace tribal courts.2 ~ See Summary Report, 
supra, at 12; Hearings on S. 961-968 and S. J. Res. 40 before 
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23, 157, 162, 341-
342 (1965) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings). Moreover., 
23 See n. 12, supra. Althougl1 C'xtensive hrarings on the ICRA were 
held in the Senate, see id., Hous<' considerat.ion was rxtrrmrly abbrevillted. 
See House Hearings, supra; 114 Cong. Bee . 9614-9615 (1968) (remarks 
of Rep. Aspinall). 
24 S. 962, 89th Cong., ht Sess. (1965), reprint.ed in 1965 Hearings, supra, 
at 6-7. Seen. 12, supra. 
2 ~ There was also concern that de novo revirw would unduly burden the 
federal district courts, and might prove too expensive for individual 
defendants . Sumarry Report , supra, nt. 12. The former concern would 
milit~te again:st inferring additional remedies under the Act ; moreover, 
since the latter was at least matched by concern a.bout financial burdens 
on the trib<'S, it doCI:i not provide support for the remedy sought by the 
respon,dents here. 
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tribal representatives argued that de novo review would 
"deprive the tribal court of all jurisdiction in the event of an 
appeal, thus having a harmful effect upon law enforcement 
within the reservation," and urged instead that "decisions of 
tribal courts ... be reviewed in the U. S. district courts upon 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 1965 Hearings, supra, 
at 79. After considering numerous alternatives for review of 
tribal convictions, Congress apparently decided that review by 
way of habeas corpus would adequately protect the individual 
interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on 
tribal governments. 
Similarly, and of more direct import to the issue in this 
case, Congress considered and rejected proposals for federal 
review of alleged violations of the Act arising in a civil con.: 
text. As initially introduced, the Act would have required 
the Attorney General to "receive and investigate" complaints 
relating to depriva.tions of an Indian's statutory or constitu-
tional rights, and to bring "such criminal or other action as he 
deems appropriate to vindicate and secure such right to· such 
India.n." 26 Notwithstanding the screening effect this pro-
posal would have had on frivo1ous or vexatious lawsuits, it was 
bitterly opposed by several tribes. ·· The Crow Tribe represent-
ative stated that, 
"This [bill] would in effect subject the tribal sovereignty 
of self-government to the Federal government. . . . [B]y 
its broad terms fit] would allow the Attorney General to 
bring any kind of action as he deems: appropriate. By 
this bill, any time a member of the tribe would not be 
satisfied with an action by the [tribal] council, it would 
allow them [sic] to file a complaint with the Attorney 
General and subject the tribe to a multitude of investiga-
tions and threat of court action." 1965 Hearings, supra,. 
at 235 (statement of Mr. Real Bird). 
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In a similar vein, the Mescalero Apache Tribal Council argued 
that "[i] f the perpetually dissatisfied individual Indian were 
to be armed with legislation such as proposed in [this bill] he 
could disrupt the whole of a tribal government." I d., at 343. 
In response, this provision for suit by the Attorney General 
was completely eliminated from the ICRA. At the same time, 
Congress rejected a substitute proposed by the Interior Depart-
ment that would have authorized the Department to adjudi-
cate civil complaints concerning tribal actions, with review in 
the district courts available from final decisions of the 
agency.27 
Given this history, it is highly unlikely that Congress would 
have intended a private cause of action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief to be available in the federal courts to secure 
enforcement of § 1302. Although the only committee report 
on the ICRA in its final form, S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. ( 1967), sheds little additional light on this question, 
27 The Interior Department substitute, reprinted in 1965 Hearings, supra, 
at 318, provided in relevant part: 
"Any action, other than a criminal action, taken by an Indian tribal 
government which deprives any American Indian of a right. or freedom 
established and protected by thk'> Act ma.y be rcviewrd by the Secretary of 
the Interior upon his own motion or upon tho reque;;t of ::;aid IndiM. If 
the Secretary determines that ~aid Indian ha;; been deprived of any such 
right or freedom, he . ha II requirr t.hr Indian tribal government. to take 
such corrective action a· he det>mR nPcessary. Any final decision of the 
Secretary may be rPviewed by the UnitPd Stnte,; di~trict. court in the district 
in which the action arose and ::;uch court shall have jurisdiction thereof." 
In urging Congress to adopt this proposal, the Solicitor of Interior 
specifically suggested that "Congrp:;,; has the power to givo to the courts 
jurisdiction that they would rpquirr to review the actions of an Indian 
tribal court," and that t.be sub:stitute bill which the DPpartment proposed 
"would actually confer on tlw di:,;trict courts the jurisdiction they require 
to consider these prob!Pms." 19fi5 Hearings, supra, at 23-24. Congress' 
failure to adopt this provision is noteworthy p!uticularly because it did 
adopt the other portion of the IntPrior ,;ub::'tit.ute bill, which led to the 
•cttrrpnt versiQIJ of§§ 1302 and 1303. Seo n. 12, 8Upra. 
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it would hardly support a contrary conclusion.2s Indeed, its 
description of the purpose of Title I,20 as well as the floor 
debates on the bill/" indi~a.te that . the ICRA was generally 
understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions 
only through the habeas corpus provisions of § 1303.31 
28 Respondents rely most hPavil)· on a rambling passagr in the Report 
discussing Talton v. Mayes nnd itH progcn~·. sre n. 8, supra, some of which 
a.rose in a civil context. S. Rep. No. 841, sup1'a, at 8-11. Although there 
is some language suggesting· that Congrrss was concerned about. the unavail-
ability of relief in federnl court, the Report nowhere states that Title I 
would be enforceable in n cau:;e of action for decla,ratory or injunctive 
relief, and the cited passage is fully consistent with the conclusion that 
Congress intended only to modify the substance of the Jaw applicable 
to Indian tribes, and to allow rnforrrment in federal court through habeas 
corpus. The Report itself chnractcrizcd the import of it:; discussion as 
follows: 
"These cases illustrate the continued denial of specific constitutional 
guarantees to litigants in tribnl court. proceedings, on the ground that the 
tribal courts are quasi-sovereign entit.irs to which general provisions in 
the Constitution do not apply." !d .. nt 10. 
29 The Report ::;tates: "The purpo;;e of Titlr I is to protect. individual 
Indians from arbitrary and unjust n.ct.ions by tribal governments. This 
is accomplished by placing certain limitHtions on an Indian tribe in the 
exercise of its powers of self-government." It explain;, further that "[i]t 
is hoped that Titlr II f25 U. S. C. § 1311] , requiring the Secreta.ry of 
Interior to recommend a modPI rodr> fto govern thP ::tdministration of 
justice] for all Indian tribeli, will implcmf'nt thr rffeet. of Title I." !d., 
at 6. (Although§ 1311 by its t.Pnm; refpr;; only to courts of Indian offenses, 
seen. 17, supra, the 8Pnate Report. makl-s clPa.r that. the code is intended 
to serve as a. model for use in all tribal romts. S. J1Pp . No. 90-841, at 
6, 11.) Thus , it. appPar::; that thP commit1t'<' viPwf'(l § 1302 a;, enforceable 
only on hn.beas corpus and in tribal forums. 
30 Senator Ervin df'scribPd the moclf'l rodo provi::;ions of Title II, see 
n . 29, supra, as "the prO]X'r vehic!P by which tlw objPctives" of Title I 
should be achieved. 113 Cong. Rcc. Ia475 (1967). And Congressman 
Reifel, one of the ICRA's chiPf supportpr:-; in the House, explained that 
"by providing for a writ of habca:-; rorpm; from the Frderal court, the bill 
would · assurp pffeetiv<' pnforcrmPnt of t.hrl:'c funclam<'ntal rights." 114-
Cong. Rec. 9553 (1968) . 
31 Only a. few tribes hncl an opportunity to comment on the ICRA in 
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This understanding is reflected in remarks made by the 
ICRA's chief sponsor, Senator Ervin of North Carolina, one 
year after its enactment. 32 Alm.ost immediately after the 
Act's passage, legislation had been introduced to exempt the 
Pueblos of the Southwest. including the Santa Clara Pueblo, 
from the requirements of Title I. In responding to tribal 
leaders supporting the proposed exemption, Senator Ervin 
explained that Title I's provisions should not prove unduly 
burdensome to tribal governments: 
11 [The ICRA] does not provide for the Federal courts to 
review all the decisions of the Indian courts. In fact, 
provision for federal review was in there originally, and 
at the request of a number of tribes we eliminated that 
entirely. The only provision in [Title I] that provides 
for Federal court interference is [the one authorizing 
issuance of a] writ of habeas corpus . . . . If the man 
was convicted in violation of a law, the Federa1 court 
its final form, since the Hou;;e held only one day of hearings on the legis-
lation. See n. 23, supra. The Pu('blo~ of New Mexico, testifying in 
opposition to the provisions of Title I. argued that. the habeas corpus 
provision of § 1303 "opens an avenue through which federal courts, lacking 
knowledge of our tr::tditional value~, <'u:;tomti, and la.ws, could review and 
offset the decisions of our tribal council::;." Hou::;e Hearings, supra, at 37. 
It is inconceivable that., had the~· understood the bill implied!~· to author-
ize other actions, they would ha.ve remained ::;ilent., a::; they did, concerning 
this possibility. It would hardly be consistrnt with "Lt]he overriding duty 
of our Federal Government. t.o deal fairly with Indian:;," Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U. S. 199, 236 ( 1974), lightly t.o imply a cause of action on which the 
tribes had no prior opportunity to prPsent their views. 
32 Senator Ervin was not. only the nominal sponsor of the ICRA, but the 
prime mover behind its enactment.. See n. 12, supra. At his prompt-ing 
the Senate commenced. exploratory hearings int.o the are<t in 1961, and in 
three successive CongrE-sses he introduced legislation to address the prob-
lems that emerged in those hearings. He is credited by some as having 
single-handedly secured pas.~ge of the bill by the force of his support for 
it. See generally Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian 
'Civil Rights"' Act, 9 Harv. J . Legis. 557, 574-602, 603 (1972). 
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light of this finding, and given Congress' desire not to intrude 
needlessly on tribal self-govemment. it is not surprising that 
Congress chose at this stage to provide for federal review only 
in habeas corpus proceedings. 
By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal 
remedies available to redress actions of federal and state offi-
cials, Congress may also have considered that resolution of 
statutory issues under § 1302, a:nd particularly those issues 
likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on 
questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums 
may be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts. 
Our relations with the Indian tribes have "always been anoma-
lous ... and of a complex character." United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381 ( 1886). Although we early re-
jected the notion that Indian tribes are "foreign states" for 
jurisdictional purposes under Art. III, Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), we have also recognized that the 
tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government 
structure, culture. and source of sovereignty are in many ways 
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and 
state governments. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 ( 1884). 
As is suggested by the District Court's opinion in this case, 
see pp. 4-5, supra, efforts by the federal judiciary to a.pply the 
statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may sub-
stantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as 
a culturally and politically distinct. entity.33 
aa A tribe's right to define it ~ own member~hip for tribal purposes has 
long been recognized as centra.l to its existence as an independent political 
community. See Roff v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (1897): Cherokee Inter-
marriage Cases, 203 U. S. 76 (1906) . The legislat.ive history of t.he ICRA, 
however, affords no basis for distingui~hing between membership questions 
and other issues in deciding whether a cause of action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief is implicit in § 1302. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 841 , supra, 
a.t 9- 10 ; 114 Cong. Rec., a.t 394 (1968) (remark::; of Sen. Ervin) . And 
given the often vast gulf bctwee.n tribal tmdit.ions and those with which 
federal courts are more intim:ttely familiar , t he judicia.r~· should not rush. 
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.JusTICE BYRON R. WHITE March 30, 1978 
Re: 76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am considering a lonesome dissent 
in this case. 
Sincerely, 
/~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
•' 
C HAM BERS O F 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEVENS 
;§n:pumt ~Ltttrl of tltt ~tti:tt~ ;§hdt.« 
~rurJrittghm. ~. ~ 2!1~~ 
March 30, 1978 
Re: 76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I do not qualify my join in your 
opinion, I also had the feeling expressed by 
Lewis that it would be better to omit Part III. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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11Jas4ittgton. ~. <!f. 2!Jbi~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 31, 1978 
Re: No. 76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
Dear Lewis and John: 
I am moderately inclined at this point to leave in 
Part III. The holding of Part III follows clearly from 
our prior decisions, and helps elucidate the background 
against which we decide the question whether to imply 
a cause of action against the individual officers. 
Moreover, I think it useful for the Court to make clear 
that if Congress decides to authorize additional actions 
under the ICRA. it must speak clearly if it chooses to 
make the tribe itself, as a sovereign entity, amenable 
to suits. 
However, if Part III continues to trouble you, or if 
it is a problem for others in the majority who have not 
yet spoken, I would be prepared to abandon it. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,ju:prtntt Q}ltlttt of tltt :Jniftb ,jfattg 
-aslfi:n:ghtn. ~. a}. 211~>!~ / 
April 5, 1978 
Re: No. 76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
Dear '!hurgood: 
IV and 
Please join me in Parts I, II,LV, and in the judgment 
in this case. I am familiar with the exchange of correspondence 
between you, Lewis, and John, and appreciate your preference 
for leaving in Part III. Nonetheless, I tend to agree with 
Harry's observation made in one of these cases during the last 
Term or so that eventually, in a proper case, we are going to 
have to take another look at the somewhat casually considered 
decision in United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); I also feel there is some slight cross-
pulling between your Part III and my recent opinion for the Court 
in Oliphant v. Suquamish, which is perhaps not surprising since 
you dissented in that case. I agree with the analysis contained 
in the rest of your opinion, and could probably join Part III 
with a few changes. But I am sure you would prefer . to get a 
Court for the whole opinion as now written, and that is why I 
am sending you this '."join" letter. 
Sincerely, 
~· 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM8ER8 01" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..ittprtm:t afourl of t4t ~~ ..§taltg 
'Jhtalfinghttt, ~. <!f. 20.;t'!~ 
April 7, 1978 
I 
/ 
Re: 76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo v~, Martinez 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 10, 1978 
Re: No. 76-682, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
Dear Thurgood, 
At the Conference discussion I expressed 
a different reason why I thought the judgment in 
this case should be reversed. I have decided, 
however, that no souls would be saved by a concur-
ring opinion on my part. Your opinion for the Court 
is very persuasive, and I am glad to join it. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
r'~ . 









24 SANTA CLARA PUEBLO v. MARTINEZ 
As we hav<' repeatedly emphasized, Congress' authority ove:r 
Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts 
in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their 
members correspondingly restrained. See Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U. S. 553, 565 ( 1903). Congress retains authority 
expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive or other 
relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the event that the 
tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and enforcing 
its substantive provisions. But unless and until Congress 
makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on 
tribal sovereignt.y that adjudication of such actions in a fed-
eral forum would represent, we are constrain,ed to find that 
§ 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or 
injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers. 
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